Russia and China are showing what it looks like when their militaries work together

The joint Russian-Chinese bomber patrol that came within 200 miles of Alaska in late July was a milestone and a message.

It was their eighth aerial patrol since 2019 and further demonstrated their strengthening military relationship. It was also their first patrol so close to US territory, underscoring what Western leaders see as those countries’ increasing willingness and ability to challenge rivals, whether in Europe, where Beijing is supporting Moscow’s war in Ukraine, or in Asia, where their operations show how they could collaborate during a crisis.

China and Russia have held joint military exercises since the mid-2000s. Their frequency and complexity have increased in recent years, as has their reach, with drills taking place around Europe, in Russia’s Far East and the Western Pacific, and in the Indian Ocean. That expansion reflects their broader shift from wary neighbors to partners in challenging the US-led international order.

But Russia and China’s joint patrols in the Pacific are more pointed messages about their ability to project power together and to do so near adversaries. Their bombers conducted their first “joint strategic air patrol” in July 2019, flying over the Sea of Japan and East China Sea, and have done six more over that area since then. Experts say the patrols themselves appear relatively unsophisticated, but repetition has allowed Russia and China to enhance them over time, gaining experience with each other’s aircraft and crews, using each other’s bases, and training with naval forces.

Russia’s and China’s navies held their first “joint sea patrol” in October 2021, sailing from the Sea of Japan through and around the Japanese archipelago and into the East China Sea. Such operations are now routine. In early July, their warships sailed from the East China Sea through Japan’s southwest islands to the Philippine Sea and into the South China Sea, where another group of Russian and Chinese warships was holding separate drills.

US officials and other observers often describe Sino-Russian military cooperation as superficial, meant more as political messaging than as preparation to fight alongside each other, but over time their militaries have gotten more compatible and added more complicated elements to their training, such as joint commands and mixed forces. Their patrols demonstrate improving proficiency in operating together.

“There is a clear upward trend in China-Russia military cooperation in terms of interoperability. Both the frequency and the complexity of joint exercises grow consistently,” Alexander Korolev, a senior lecturer and expert on Sino-Russian relations at the University of New South Wales, said in an email. After Russia said in 2019 that it would help China develop an early-warning radar system, “it is possible to talk about an early advanced level of interoperability, which is still lower than the one the US has with its core allies, but the gap is shrinking,” Korolev added.

The US and its allies in Northeast Asia “continue to watch with interest the development” of Sino-Russian military relations, Gen. Kevin Schneider, the commander of Pacific Air Forces, a part of US Indo-Pacific Command, said in an interview in July.

Schneider witnessed those first air patrols as commander of US Forces Japan between February 2019 and August 2021. Schneider said Sino-Russian cooperation is not comparable to how the US and its allies “drive toward interoperability, interchangeability, and the closeness that we share,” but the fact that they “come together to do these activities is something that we certainly should pay attention to, because they are looking to find ways to exploit or to challenge the peace and stability of the region.”

Their activities have already had that effect. Past Russian and Chinese bomber patrols have flown over Dokdo Island, which South Korea controls but Japan claims. Seoul and Tokyo have both scrambled aircraft in response to those flights, in turn aggravating their own territorial dispute. That provocation has worked “incredibly well,” James D.J. Brown, a professor and expert on Russian-Japanese relations at Temple University in Japan, said in a recent interview.

Japan also has disputes with China over the Senkaku Islands to its southwest and with Russia over the Kuril Islands to its north. Tokyo is shifting its military’s focus to its southwest islands in response to Chinese activity there, but it remains concerned about Russia, which maintains forces in the Kurils, including anti-ship and anti-aircraft missiles.

Russia’s military activity to the north “coupled with its strategic partnership with China” pose “a strong security concern,” Japan’s Defense Ministry said in its most recent annual defense white paper, published in July. But the paper cast Russia’s cooperation with China in more severe terms: “These repeated joint activities are clearly intended for demonstration of force against Japan and are a grave concern from the perspective of the national security of Japan.”

Tokyo is less worried about Russia attacking it than about Russia acting as what Brown has called “an accomplice” to China or North Korea. Japanese officials link their country’s security to Taiwan’s, and Russian involvement in a contingency there “is a major concern for Japan,” Brown said. Recent activity gives weight to that concern. Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, told lawmakers in May that US intelligence agencies have seen China and Russia “for the first time exercising together in relation to Taiwan.”

“This is a place where China definitely wants Russia to be working with them, and we see no reason why they wouldn’t,” Haines added.

Russia’s support could take many forms. Brown said Moscow is unlikely to get directly involved in a conflict over Taiwan, “but they can help in other ways, such as providing diplomatic support, diplomatic cover, but also potentially diversionary activities.”

If Moscow wanted to apply lower-level pressure to Japan, Brown said, it could hold live-fire drills in the Sea of Japan. “If they want to take it further, then they could perhaps have incursions into” Japanese waters or airspace, Brown added. “They could also drag off a few Japanese fishing boats if they want to do a bit of hostage diplomacy. They've done that before.”

Korolev said Russia was more likely to offer “indirect support,” describing that as “a loose concept” that could go beyond information operations or cyber operations. “I would rule out commitment of Russian military forces because China does not have a shortage of that,” Korolev said, “but supply of weapons is not impossible.”

If Moscow wanted to create diversions, it has options. Its aircraft have patrolled near Alaska regularly since 2007. They avoid US airspace but are always closely monitored by the US military. Russia’s navy is also increasingly active near Alaska, including in patrols with Chinese warships. (Chinese ships have started doing patrols near Alaska as well.) In a crisis, Russia could escalate those operations to distract the US. It could also raise tensions in Europe, either by ramping up attacks in Ukraine or by conducting major exercises with or without Chinese forces. (Their militaries have done joint drills around Europe before, most recently in the Baltic Sea in late July.)

Moscow’s response may depend on who’s fighting. It has close relations with India and Vietnam, which both have disputes with China, Korolev said. “So if a conflict between these states and China occurs, Russia is more likely to help mitigate the tensions instead of providing military support. If the conflict involves the United States or its core allies, such as Japan, then Russia’s reaction will be very different.”

China has helped Russia sustain its war in Ukraine with diplomatic backing, military-related and industrial material, and expanded trade, and it may try to use that support as leverage in the future. Russian leaders would prefer “to benefit from distraction to present themselves a responsible stakeholder” in such a scenario, Brown said, “but the problem there is that Russia is in such a weaker position vis a vis Beijing that if Beijing wants to twist their arm, to use their economic leverage, then they perhaps might force Russia to do something that they don't want to.”

“Overall, I don't think Russia would be doing this with any great enthusiasm,” Brown said.

Russia and China still do not have a formal alliance, and their relationship does have tensions and some limits, but their alignment with each other and collaboration with other US adversaries, especially Iran and North Korea, only add to concerns about those regimes capitalizing on turmoil in one part of the world to create “simultaneous conflicts” that further strain Washington’s already taxed attention and resources.

China, North Korea, and Russia have made “opportunist” moves in East Asia over “the last few years,” Schneider said. While they “may not act in concert,” he added, “if it is something going on with Beijing or something going on with Moscow, if the world's attention is distracted, Pyongyang may take advantage and [Kim Jong Un] may look to advance some of his efforts. The same is true in Beijing with Xi Jinping. Same is true in Moscow with Putin.”